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Alcohol has been commercially produced in South Africa (SA) 
since the 17th century and continues to play an important economic 
role in the country. However, the country has a significant problem 
with alcohol abuse. Although survey results from SA show that 
only about a third of adults indicate that they consume alcohol,[1,2] 
nearly half of alcohol users reported that they consume five or 
more standard drinks on an average drinking day.[2] According to 
the World Health Organization (WHO), SA’s pattern of drinking 
is categorised as ‘most risky’, in the same category as the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine, among others.[3]
Unsurprisingly, alcohol abuse imposes a heavy toll on SA 
society. The country has the world’s highest prevalence of fetal 
alcohol syndrome.[4] A recent Global Burden of Disease study 
placed alcohol use in SA as the sixth risk factor for disability-
adjusted life-years lost and the seventh risk factor for death.[5] A 
2018 study found that 62 300 people died from alcohol-attributable 
causes in SA in 2015.[6] The study also found that even though 
the prevalence of alcohol use in lower socioeconomic groups is 
lower than in the rest of the population, drinkers in those groups 
had heavier drinking patterns, resulting in substantially higher 
alcohol-attributable mortality rates.
The tangible financial cost of harmful alcohol use was estimated 
at 1.6% of SA’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009.[7] Combined 
with the very substantial intangible costs, the total cost of alcohol 
harm to the economy was estimated at between 10% and 12% of 
the 2009 GDP.[7] In the 2018/19 fiscal year, excise taxes on alcohol 
products yielded nearly ZAR29 billion, or 2%, of total government 
revenue.[8] This percentage has increased slightly over the past 
decade. While alcohol taxes provide substantial revenue to the 
fiscus, the direct cost of alcohol abuse to national and provincial 
governments (borne primarily by the departments of Health, 
Social Development, Safety and Security, Justice and Constitutional 
Development, Correctional Services, Transport, and Economic 
Development) are greater than the sum of alcohol excise tax and 
value-added tax revenues.[9] The implication is that taxes on alcohol 
do not even cover the government’s direct costs associated with 
alcohol abuse, let alone the broader societal costs.
Whereas previously the medical literature suggested that moderate 
use of alcohol may have some beneficial health effects,[10] more 
recent studies indicate that alcohol use, even in small quantities, is 
harmful.[11] In SA, with its high prevalences of drinking and driving, 
and alcohol-related gender-based and domestic violence, the focus 
has typically been on heavy drinking. In fact, during the COVID-19 
lockdown, the sale of alcohol was banned for some months, primarily 
to reduce the acute negative consequences of excessive alcohol 
consumption.[12]
The WHO has identified tax increases on alcohol products as one 
of the most cost-effective means to reduce alcohol consumption and 
thus improve public health.[13] An increase in the excise tax typically 
increases the price of alcohol, and this reduces the demand for the 
product. A 2009 meta-analysis found that the price elasticity of 
demand for beer, globally, is about –0.5, indicating that for every 10% 
increase in the price, the demand for beer decreases by an average of 
5%.[14] The average price elasticity for wine is –0.7 and for spirits –0.8.[14] 
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The government can use an increase in the excise tax to increase the 
retail price of alcohol. A 2016 study demonstrated that in SA, where 
most alcohol is consumed as beer, the beer industry increases the 
retail price of beer by more than the increase in the excise tax on an 
annual basis, making excise tax increases a particularly effective way of 
reducing consumption of the product.[15] In comparison with cigarettes, 
the excise tax increases on alcohol in SA in the post-apartheid period 
have been modest. The real (inflation-adjusted) excise tax on cigarettes 
increased by >450% between 1994 and 2020.[16] In comparison, real 
excise taxes on beer increased by 70%, on spirits by 160%, and on wine 
by 244% over the same period.[16]
Excise tax and price increases have different effects on different 
categories of drinkers. A 2009 systematic review, which considered 
>100 studies and >1 000 price elasticity estimates, found that heavy 
drinkers (price elasticity of –0.21) responded less to price increases 
than moderate drinkers (price elasticity of –0.41).[17] The implication 
is that excise tax increases are not particularly well suited for 
targeting heavy drinkers. An excise tax increase may therefore be 
a blunt instrument to reduce alcohol use among heavy drinkers. 
Furthermore, heavy drinkers tend to buy cheaper, and more potent, 
alcohol than moderate drinkers.[18-20]
Since heavy drinkers are not very responsive to price changes and 
tend to buy cheaper alcohol than moderate drinkers, some countries 
have implemented or have considered implementing minimum unit 
prices (MUPs) on alcohol. An MUP is not a tax, but rather a legally 
mandated ‘floor price’ below which retailers are not permitted to sell 
alcohol.[21] For example, in May 2018, Scotland introduced an MUP 
of 50 pence (about ZAR9.00) per unit of alcohol (defined as 8 g or 
10 mL of ethanol).[22,23] The explicit aim of the policy was to reduce 
alcohol abuse by removing very cheap alcohol from the market.[23] 
Canada already has MUPs in some provinces, while England and 
Australia are considering this policy. Evidence from Canada shows 
that MUPs have been particularly effective at curbing hazardous 
drinking.[24-26] Simulation exercises have shown that MUPs are likely 
to have similar effects in Australia, England and Scotland.[27-31]
Objectives
In this article we investigate the drinking patterns, and the distribution 
of unit values (a proxy for the price), of four groups of drinking 
households in SA (moderate-, intermediate-, occasional heavy- and 
regular heavy-drinking households). We further investigate the 
possible impact of hypothetical MUPs on the alcohol consumption 
of these four groups of households in SA.
Methods
We used data from wave 4 (2015) of the National Income Dynamics 
Study (NIDS).[32] NIDS is SA’s first nationally representative panel 
study. The first wave of data was collected in 2008, from 7 300 house-
holds, while wave 4 sampled 11 800 households. Although wave 5 
data were collected in 2017 and released in 2018, respondents were 
not asked any alcohol-related questions in this wave.
The NIDS survey is comprehensive and considers a range of 
socioeconomic, demographic, health and welfare issues. There are 
three alcohol-related questions. Two of the questions were asked of 
individual adults (age ≥15 years), while the third question was asked 
at the household level. The first adult-level question is ‘How often 
do you drink alcohol?’, with options ‘I have never drunk alcohol’, ‘I 
no longer drink alcohol’, ‘I drink very rarely’, ‘Less than once a week’, 
‘On 1 or 2 days a week’, ‘On 3 or 4 days a week’, ‘On 5 or 6 days a 
week’, and ‘Every day’. The second adult-level question is: ‘On a day 
that you have an alcoholic drink, how many standard drinks do you 
usually have?’. This question has the following six options: 13 or 
more, 9 - 12, 7 - 8, 5 - 6, 3 or 4, and 1 or 2 standard drinks. The NIDS 
defines a standard drink as a small glass of wine, a 330 mL can of 
regular beer, a tot of spirits, or a mixed drink.[33] The third question 
asks the respondent reporting on behalf of the whole household to 
indicate the amount of money the household spent on alcohol in the 
previous month.
The monthly alcohol consumption of each drinking member in 
the household was calculated, based on frequency of use and the 
reported average use per day on which the respondent consumed 
alcohol. For responses that included a range, we chose the top 
end of the range, since respondents typically under-report their 
drinking.[34] The household’s total monthly consumption was the 
aggregate of the individuals’ reported monthly consumption. The 
aggregation was necessary because expenditure on alcohol, an 
important variable for our study, is only reported at the household 
level. Consequently, our analysis was conducted at the household 
level.
The NIDS questionnaire did not explicitly ask each respondent 
the average price that they paid per unit of alcohol. In order to 
get an approximation of the price, we calculated ‘unit values’ by 
dividing monthly household expenditure on alcohol by total monthly 
household consumption of alcohol. Unit values are often used in 
applied research as appropriate proxies for prices when actual prices 
are unavailable.[35] Unit values are sensitive to quality differences; 
households that purchase higher-quality beverages tend to have 
higher unit values than households that purchase lower-quality 
beverages. In this article, we use unit values as a proxy for prices paid 
by different types of drinking households.
If all adult respondents in a household indicate that they either 
have never consumed alcohol or no longer consume alcohol, the 
household is classified as a non-drinking household. Drinking 
households (i.e. those with at least one drinker) were subdivided into 
four categories: 
• Moderately drinking households. These are households where 
the member with the highest daily consumption consumed 1 or 2 
standard drinks per day, irrespective of the number of days that the 
person consumed alcohol.
• Intermediate-drinking households. These are households where 
the member with the highest daily consumption consumed 3 or 4 
standard drinks per day, irrespective of the number of days that the 
person consumed alcohol.
• Occasional heavy-drinking households. These are households 
where at least one member consumed at least 5 standard drinks 
on a typical drinking day, but drank no more than twice a week. 
If another member of the household was classified as a light or 
moderate drinker, the presence of the occasional heavy drinker 
(often termed a binge drinker) would classify it as an occasional 
heavy-drinking household.
• Regular heavy-drinking households. These are households where 
at least one person consumed alcohol at least 3 times a week, and 
who drank at least 5 standard drinks on a typical drinking day.
In the subsequent analysis, when we use the term ‘heavy-drinking 
households’ we refer to both occasional and regular heavy-drinking 
households. Next, we ranked each of the four types of drinking 
households from that with the lowest reported unit value to that with 
the highest unit value. Each household was weighted according to its 
monthly alcohol consumption, multiplied by the NIDS sample weight. 
For example, if a household consumed 200 standard drinks per 
month, and has a NIDS sample weight of 4 000 (i.e. is representative 
of 4 000 households), this household represents 800 000 standard 
drinks consumed per month. For each of the four types of drinking 
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households, we calculated the sum of all these 
weighted household consumption values 
across all relevant households, to get the total 
number of standard drinks consumed in a 
month. From this total value, we were able to 
calculate the percentage of alcohol that was 
consumed at or below certain unit values, by 
drinker category.
Once we determined the distribution of 
unit values (by type of drinking household), 
we imposed a hypothetical MUP on alcohol. 
The MUP would have no impact on the 
consumption of households with an estimated 
unit value above this MUP. However, for 
households with a declared unit value below 
the MUP, the imposition of the MUP would 
imply an increase in the price they would 
have to pay, with a concomitant decrease 
in quantity consumed. The decrease in the 
quantity consumed depends on the difference 
between the calculated unit value (as declared 
by the household’s alcohol expenditure and 
alcohol consumption) and the MUP, and the 
price elasticity of demand for alcohol. Based 
on price elasticities that were estimated in 
a 2018 report, and that were subsequently 
updated, the price elasticity of demand for 
alcohol for moderately drinking households 
was taken as –0.45, for intermediate-drinking 
households as –0.35, for occasional heavy-
drinking households as –0.22 and for regular 
heavy-drinking households as –0.18.[36] These 
elasticities by type of drinker are in line 
with those obtained in the international 
literature.[14]
Because the percentage change in the price 
is substantial in many instances, standard 
economic theory indicates that one should 
use the arc (also known as the midpoint) 
formulation of the price elasticity of demand to 
estimate the new level of consumption.[37] The 
arc elasticity formulation avoids a situation 
where a substantial increase in the price may 
lead to a >100% decrease in consumption. 
For example, if the price elasticity is –0.6, 
a 200% price increase will result in a 120% 
(= –0.6 × 200%) decrease in consumption, if 
one uses the point elasticity version. A decrease 
of >100% is mathematically impossible. 
Using the arc formulation, the decrease in 
consumption, even if the price increase is very 
large, will be <100%. Given the hypothetical 
numbers above, a 200% price increase will 
result in a 46.2% decrease in consumption.
Results
Some descriptive statistics, categorised 
by non-drinking households and the four 
groups of alcohol-consuming households, 
are shown in Table 1. Except in the first line, 
all statistics are based on weighted data.
Table 1 indicates that the consumption of 
alcohol is very unevenly distributed in SA. 
While heavy drinking is limited to <25% of 
households (50% of drinking households), 
these households consume 84% of total 
reported alcohol consumption. Regular 
heavy-drinking households consume a 
median of nearly 160 standard drinks per 
month. Heavy-drinking households tend to 
have a higher average number of drinkers 
than moderate- and intermediate-drinking 
households. Males are more likely to head 
households that consume (any) alcohol, 
and are more likely to head regular heavy-
drinking households.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of non-drinking and various categories of drinking households, 2015*
Non-drinking Moderate Intermediate Occasional heavy Regular heavy
Households in sample (unweighted) 5 141 830 1 205 2 046 403
Number of households (weighted, thousands) 8 706 1 882 2 318 3 535 674
Total households, % 50.9 11.0 13.5 20.7 3.9
Total drinking households, % 0 22.4 27.6 42.0 8.0
Alcohol consumed, % 0 3.2 12.7 32.6 51.5
Median number of standard drinks per month 
per household
0 1.5 7.0 15.0 159.3
Average number of standard drinks per month 
per drinker per household
0 4.3 11.0 19.6 103.0
Average household size 4.4 4.5 4.8 5.2 5.3
Average number of drinkers in household† 0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
Average age of household head (years) 46.4 48.3 47.0 45.3 49.0
Male-headed households, % 36.2 52.0 54.6 51.8 56.3
*Source data: National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) wave 4.[32]
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Fig. 1. Cumulative distribution of the unit value of standard drinks consumed by various categories of 
drinking households (source data: National Income Dynamics Study wave 4[32]).
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In Fig. 1 we show the cumulative distribution of the unit value 
of standard drinks consumed by the four categories of drinking 
households, for various unit value (price) points. These points 
do not increase in a linear fashion. We adjusted the unit values 
(which were collected in 2014) with the inflation rate to reflect 
2019 values. The median unit value of a standard drink consumed 
by moderately drinking households was ZAR12.00. In contrast, the 
median unit value of a standard drink consumed by intermediate-
drinking households was ZAR6.46, of occasional heavy-drinking 
households ZAR6.36, and of regular heavy-drinking households 
ZAR1.53. As shown by the vertical line, >90% of alcohol consumed 
by regular heavy-drinking households has a unit value of ZAR5.00 
or less per standard drink, compared with 41% of alcohol consumed 
by occasional heavy-drinking households, 45% by intermediate-
drinking households and 9% by moderately drinking households.
There is a large discrepancy between the distributions of unit values 
reported by the four types of drinking households, making an MUP a 
potentially effective tool to address heavy and intermediate drinking. 
In Table 2, we illustrate the impact of imposing an MUP on the 
consumption of each of the four categories of drinking households, 
for a variety of unit value thresholds. For any household with a 
calculated unit value at the outset less than the MUP, the imposition 
of the MUP would be expected to reduce alcohol consumption. The 
reduction in consumption is a function of the price elasticity of 
demand and the difference between the MUP and the reported unit 
value for that household. A household that is relatively more sensitive 
to changes in the price of alcohol (typically a moderately drinking 
household), or that purchases very cheap alcohol at the outset, 
would be expected to show a greater decrease in consumption after 
imposition of the MUP than households that are less price sensitive, 
or that purchase relatively more expensive alcohol at the outset.
Should the MUP be set at a very low ZAR2.00 per unit, alcohol 
use is likely to decrease by 0.1% among moderately drinking 
households, 0.9% among intermediate-drinking households, 1.6% 
among occasional heavy-drinking households and 8.5% among 
regular heavy-drinking households. The differential impact on 
the different groups of drinking households reflects the very large 
differences in the unit values reported by these households before 
the imposition of the hypothetical MUP. If the MUP is set at a 
higher level, consumption would decrease among all four drinking 
categories, but the impact is not linear. For example, if the MUP 
were to be set at ZAR6.00 per unit, alcohol consumption among 
moderately drinking households would decrease by 2.0%, among 
intermediate-drinking households by 9.7%, among occasional heavy-
drinking households by 7.1% and among regular heavy-drinking 
households by 18.0%. For all MUP thresholds indicated in Table 2, 
the impact on regular heavy-drinking households is the highest, even 
though they are the least price responsive. The reason is that, because 
these households, on average, pay very low prices for their alcohol, 
the MUP will cause substantial increases in those prices, which in 
turn would decrease consumption.
As the MUP is set at progressively higher levels, it will have a 
relatively greater impact on alcohol consumption by moderately 
drinking households, because they are substantially more sensitive 
to price changes than the other categories of drinking households.
Discussion
This study shows that, were the government to implement an MUP 
on alcohol products successfully and effectively, it could substantially 
decrease the alcohol consumption of regular heavy-drinking households, 
and to a lesser extent that of occasional heavy-drinking and intermediate-
drinking households. Despite the fact that these categories of drinking 
households are relatively price insensitive, an MUP, levied at an 
appropriate level, would substantially increase the price. This, in turn, 
would substantially influence households’ level of consumption.
If the aim of a tax or pricing policy is to reduce consumption by 
heavy and intermediate drinkers, while having a limited effect on 
moderate drinkers, an MUP is more effective than an increase in the 
excise tax. An excise tax increase will cause the prices of all alcoholic 
beverages to increase, while an MUP would only target low-priced 
products. Low-priced alcohol products are disproportionately heavily 
consumed by regular heavy-drinking households, and to a lesser extent 
by occasional heavy-drinking and intermediate-drinking households.
There is an important caveat. Because the demand for alcohol 
is price inelastic, especially for heavy-drinking households, a large 
increase in the price of alcohol will increase such households’ total 
alcohol expenditure, and therefore the share of alcohol in the total 
budget. Other expenditures would be increasingly crowded out by 
alcohol. While this does not nullify the effectiveness of an MUP as a 
policy to reduce alcohol use, especially by heavy-drinking households, 
it may deepen the financial hardship of such households.
Study limitations
Firstly, this is a conceptual study, in which we investigated the rationale 
for implementing an MUP on alcohol. It is not an implementation 
study. For example, we did not investigate the prices of alcohol 
Table 2. Expected percentage change in alcohol consumption for different MUP levels










2 –0.1 –0.9 –1.6 –8.5
3 –0.3 –2.3 –3.1 –11.9
4 –0.5 –4.9 –4.4 –14.5
5 –1.1 –7.4 –5.8 –16.5
6 –2.0 –9.7 –7.1 –18.0
7 –3.0 –11.6 –8.3 –19.3
8 –3.7 –13.2 –9.5 –20.3
9 –4.8 –14.6 –10.6 –21.1
10 –6.1 –15.9 –11.6 –21.8
MUP = minimum unit price; NIDS = National Income Dynamics Study.
*The NIDS defines a standard drink as a small glass of wine, a 330 mL can of regular beer, a tot of spirits or a mixed drink. Data derived from NIDS wave 4 data.[32] The following price elasticities 
are used for the analysis: –0.45 for moderately drinking households, –0.35 for intermediate-drinking households, –0.22 for occasional heavy-drinking households and –0.18 for regular heavy-
drinking households.
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products in various retail outlets to determine which products could 
potentially be subject to an MUP. Substantially more work would be 
required before an MUP can be considered an implementable policy, 
including, for example, determining the legal basis for such a policy, 
determining the level of the MUP, and estimating how it would 
influence the competitive landscape between alcohol producers.
Secondly, there could be substantial distortions in the unit value 
and consumption data, because people generally under-report alcohol 
consumption. A 2018 study found that the NIDS data reported only 
about 22% of total recorded and unrecorded consumption in 2014 - 
2015.[2] It is not clear whether individual drinkers under-report their 
consumption, or whether the prevalence of alcohol use is under-
reported (i.e. people indicating that they do not consume alcohol, 
when in fact they do).[6] Relatedly, the NIDS questionnaire relies 
on a ‘representative’ household member to provide information on 
alcohol consumption for all household members. It is likely that the 
‘representative’ household member may not have a complete picture 
of alcohol consumption for each and every member of the household.
Total expenditure on alcohol, according to the weighted NIDS 
data, was ZAR16 billion in 2014 - 2015. Based on consumption 
figures from the South African Wine Industry Statistics,[38] and tax 
data, total expenditure on alcohol in 2015 was about ZAR85 billion, 
which suggests that only about 19% of total alcohol expenditure was 
recorded in the NIDS data. Because consumption and expenditure 
are under-reported to a similar degree, the estimates of the unit 
values, on average, are roughly correct. However, the extent to 
which households’ misreporting of their alcohol consumption and 
expenditure deviates from the average degree of misreporting will 
distort the unit values and the subsequent analysis. However, even if 
there is some distortion in the unit values, the results are so clear cut 
that they are unlikely to invalidate the basic message of this article, 
namely that an effective MUP would substantially reduce alcohol 
consumption in heavy- and intermediate-drinking households.
Conclusions
Like most countries, SA imposes an excise tax on alcohol products. 
Increases in the tax increase the retail price and make the product 
less affordable, and therefore reduce consumption. However, excise 
taxes are not particularly effective in reducing alcohol consumption 
among heavy- and intermediate-drinking households, because these 
are relatively insensitive to changes in the price of alcohol. In this 
article, we showed that the imposition of an MUP on alcohol 
is a more targeted means of reducing heavy and intermediate 
drinking in SA. Heavy and intermediate drinkers typically consume 
much cheaper alcohol than moderate drinkers do. An MUP could 
substantially increase the average price that such drinkers pay for 
their alcohol, and, despite their relative price insensitivity, still bring 
about substantial changes in their alcohol consumption. An MUP 
could substantially reduce heavy and intermediate drinking in SA.
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